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America is a maritime nation bounded by two vast oceans that ultimately connect and cover nearly three-quarters of the earth's surface with water that eventually combines into a single global source that touches the shores of every continent. Given these natural dynamics, it is therefore logical that this nation should rely heavily upon its naval forces as a valuable instrument of military power. Throughout American history, Sailors and Marines have answered their nation's call as expeditionary forces projecting power ashore and fighting America's limited wars, as well as, emergent contingency operations, and major theater wars. In the near future they will accomplish this mission while deployed around the globe within the new concept of Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG).
This essay describes the ESG concept and argues that in the post-Cold War/September 11 th security environment, the ESG concept is sound operational force employment for America's future limited wars, but the idea is not new. Through historical research of America's limited wars and analysis of the new ESG concept, this essay will attempt to prove the thesis by overlaying historical analysis of limited wars fought by US naval forces, with current visions of the proposed ESG concept. Then, the ESG concept will be viewed in the context of the newly declared (and exercised in Iraq) national security strategy, which includes preemption with military force.
Prelude to the Expeditionary Strike Group Notion
Until fairly recently in American history, the oceans that cover the earth provided both a real, and visibly tangible, defensive security barrier along America's borders.
However, America's security environment changed drastically with the end of the Cold War, and even more dramatically following the terrorists attacks of September 11 th 2001. operational deployment model that has dominated naval amphibious force employment for decades. Indeed, the ESG concept adds substantial independent striking power to the traditional ARG, with the addition of dedicated strike-capable surface warships and submarines to the battle force. 4 Many commentators hail the ESG and believe it "…could emerge as 'Sea Power 21's' most revolutionary vision." 5 Moreover, that the ESG will distribute the fleet's firepower "…more widely to provide enhanced presence, greater operational flexibility, and
[reduced] response time should there be simultaneous conflicts or contingencies." 6 For sure, these accolades attest to the broad excitement generated by the notion of linking the potent striking power of Tomahawk's and Marines into a single battle group package.
The marriage of Marines to our Navy's most potent surface strike power was consummated immediately subsequent to the birth of each service and continued through operational deployments throughout World War Two. Whether it takes the form of today's Tomahawk cruise missiles, or Frigates from the age of sail, the notion of combining Navy striking power with Marine Corps ground assault power remained a happy union until the Iron Curtain fell. During the Cold War, the amphibious striking power of the Marine Corps was gradually migrated to the "Gator Navy" and deployed as a separate amphibious assault force made-up exclusively of amphibious ships. While the cruiser-destroyer (CRUDES) Navy undertook the role of air and submarine defense for the high-value carriers and battleships, the submarine force tackled the critical submarine launched ballistic missile offensive/defensive mission. But only rarely did the two naval task forces mingle. However, a comparison of naval operational capabilities between the ARG of today and the ESG of the future reveals substantial task force enhancements organic only to the ESG concept. The augmentation of naval surface, subsurface, and increased air assets to the three-ship ARG force will result in a multi-mission expeditionary battle force able to provide theater combatant commanders with greater operational flexibility, enhanced naval presence, substantially increased striking power to shape events well inland, "…and [reduced] response time should there be simultaneous conflicts or contingencies."
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In the small wars of the future, the ESG will be much more flexible and mission capable military force than the traditional ARG. In these environments, in addition to the ARG mission of projecting Marine ground power ashore and sustaining them, an ESG will also be able to defend itself at sea, maintain sea control in the littoral, strike targets deep ashore in enemy territory, and conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) of A familiarity with the situational events and their lessons learned provide insightful study for today's small warriors. Naval history should be more than a phrase that describes past naval events and patterns. To be sure, many aspects of these events and patterns in naval history can, and should, be utilized as chart overlays for future operations and patterns when similar adversaries or operational conditions occur. Again, the question arises on the validity of the ESG concept for the 21 st century. It would be a false assumption to suggest that the conditions affecting naval operations today bears little resemblance to past periods.
Further examination of naval history is warranted.
Similar conditions and adversaries in the nation's security environment can be located in the pivotal decades following the Spanish-American War, and it is during this period where the roles of our expeditionary naval forces must be revisited to search for comparitive insight and potential lessons learned. This era in naval history offers a discerning comparison with the current environment that gave birth to the ESG concept and likely, the future environment where ESG forces will operate.
Suddenly, with the end of the Spanish-American War the United States was thrust onto the world stage with far-flung responsibilities and new security interests. All of the sudden, it became undeniably clear that America had overseas security interests even beyond its new territorial possessions that had to be influenced. Boot points out that Sailors and
Marines would no longer land on foreign soil for a few days to quell a riot, now they would need to stay longer to manage or change the internal politics of nations. In this altered security environment, America's preference was to exercise power diplomatically and economically, but when this failed, the United States was not shy about applying "…the brass knuckles hidden beneath the velvet glove. Army was unable to arrive before the fighting concluded (even after preparing to deploy for a year) 24 , and the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Team emerged as America's new "9-1-1"
force of small warriors. This team deployed from a naval task force that was very similar in design and composition to that proposed in the ESG concept.
In the coming years before World War Two, this naval team of small warriors was repeatedly called into action. They were relied upon heavily in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic to hone their new missions as America settled into the responsibilities of a great power. The Navy and Marine Corps learned countless lessons from these small war operations that were applied during World War Two operations and throughout the Cold War. They made a specialty out of fighting small wars verses elusive foes that utilized asymmetric tactics -and no military force ever did it better. 25 Maybe there are still lessons that can be extracted from this period for current and future naval operations. Additionally, perhaps the concept they utilized of integrating the Navy's strike warships with Marine
Corps strike power is a formula that makes operational wisdom today.
Will the ESG concept meet the needs of the nation in the 21 st century security environment? A crucial question that appears to have been fully considered by the CNO while developing Sea Power 21 during the budding months of President Bush's national security strategy, or "Bush Doctrine."
Expeditionary Strike Group and the National Security Strategy
Given the myriad of capabilities organic to an ESG, finding a functional home for the concept in the Bush Doctrine should not be difficult. In his speech to the nation aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln (May 2003), the President made it clear to "…friend and foe alike, that our nation has a mission…" to confront terrorist groups and "any outlaw regime [with] ties to terrorist groups and seeks or possesses weapons of mass destruction…". 26 The
President demonstrated the will to use military force to confront these threats in Afghanistan, and drove it home again in Iraq.
The rise of America during the 20 th century to superpower status coincided with the nations parallel ascendance as an expeditionary sea power. Events from this historical era show that preemptive military force is not a new notion. In fact, naval history is crammed with clear examples of preemptive force using the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Team.
However, during World War Two and the Cold War, American military leaders abandoned its small war imperial tradition and focused doctrine and procurement toward large-scale conventional warfare. Today, the security environment is much closer aligned with the preWorld War Two years of small wars, than anytime throughout the Cold War years.
Nevertheless, in each period, the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Team is being asked to engage in small war operations armed in most instances with superior technology and striking power, against foes that possess superior numbers and better local knowledge of culture and terrain.
Following the end of the Cold War, many political analysts assert that the United
States muddled through the 1990's with strategies that failed to fully address its new leadership role in the world, or the radically altered security environment. However, the 2002 National Security Strategy addresses Americas position in the world and outlines a 'Bush Doctrine' to safeguard US national security. The Bush Doctrine calls for the US to identify and destroy the terrorist threat "before it reaches our borders," and if necessary, acting alone with preemptive force.
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What is preemption? The Department of Defense defines preemptive attack as "An attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent."
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The President's 2002 National Security Strategy is clear that sometimes, preemptive action is necessary, because "…our security environment has undergone profound transformation."
The document declares to the world that America reserves the right to act preemptively and plans to maintain unchallenged military superiority to win the GWOT and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that now pose the greatest threat to US national security. 29 Like it or not, Americans have become a de facto, or informal, imperial power and the military will be called upon to fill many of the missions associated with this responsibility. The Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Team of the future will have to be flexible enough to conduct a wider array of missions, and perhaps, be prepared to remain on station longer to perform the constabulary duties required to preserve order and establish the conditions for long-term success in a given region. It is unlikely that today's ARG will have this flexibility, but the proposed ESG concept may fulfill the requirement.
Like the CSGs, the ESG will provide the President with the same strategic advantages of forward deployed deep strike, independent sovereignty, self-sustainability, speed and mobility, but with the added bonus of "boots-on-the-ground" through embarked Marinesimportant attributes for a preemptive strategy. the GWOT. 32 The Marine Corps "Small Wars Manual" focuses on the "Banana Wars"
(primarily Nicaragua and Haiti) and dissects all aspects of these small wars, from strategy and phases, to psychology and civil relations. 33 Both books detail hard lessons won during a host of missions that bear striking resemblance to those likely to be assigned to the proposed ESG.
Expeditionary Strike Group -Some Final Thoughts on Implementation
Sea Strike guidance for 2003 calls for experimental deployments from each coast to test the ESG concept. 34 The deploying Atlantic and Pacific Fleet ESGs are scheduled to have fundamental differences in place that will allow for a thorough comparison of various command-and-control relationships, as well as force composition and employment. For example, the Pacific Fleet ESG will deploy with a flag officer in command, whereas the Atlantic Fleet ESG plans to deploy with a senior Captain in command. 35 This example serves to illustrate one of many challenges that must be flushed out through concept experimentation and overcome. All new operational concepts require refinement, and the ESG is no exception. A host of developmental concerns will need to be addressed in the initial ESG deployments, training exercises, and Sea Trial experiments. In addition to the overarching command relationship concerns, issues pertaining to organic submarine control and employment, TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures), and InterDeployment Training Cycle integration, are but a few of the many doctrinal issues that must be refined before the ESG is a fully integrated fleet concept.
Expeditionary Strike Group -New Label or New Concept?
The ESG concept of linking Navy strike warships with Marines Corps strike power ashore is not new. More to the point, it is the historical bread and butter of why our nation wants a Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Team -to monitor and influence world events.
This integration of naval striking power is a formula that makes operational wisdom today, just as it did during the era that defined small wars.
Furthermore, the ESG concept is needed because it is the military force best suited to take the pulse of the earth from the safe and sovereign environment of the world's oceans, and then, when required, to provide a shock to the soil in order to sync the rhythm with the desires of the United States. Potential enemies know America has taken an interest in regional events when American warships arrive in the waters nearest their borders. Further, they know America plans to shape events when joint air power and Tomahawks enter their airspace, but they truly understand that the United States means to make a lasting difference when the Marines come ashore from a powerful naval force afloat. The ESG concept is a marriage of this naval strike power that is timely for today's security environment.
This essay has clearly outlined the past and potential future utility and flexibility that a forward-deployed Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Team offers. However, the question remains unanswered as to whether the ESG concept outlined in Sea Power 21 is a unique employment of naval forces, or merely a new label for the age-old linkage of naval strike power and Marines. Historical examples of similar linkages of forces during time periods when the nation faced comparable threats point to patterns and strategies of naval employment that indicate a natural reassessment through time, by naval leaders, to align task force composition to the mission and the threat. In which case, the ESG concept would not be "new", but a coherent argument can still be made that this reassessment and realignment is an imaginative transformation of the Navy to meet a new threat environment.
Can a century-old script be applied to a 21 st century naval warfare concept?
Regardless of whether the ESG concept is old or new, its basic tenants can still serve the nation and the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Team as successfully today as it was during the small wars in naval history. Moreover, the lessons learned by naval forces during this era indicate that the ESG operational concept will prove equally as sound and valid in today's security environment.
The ESG provides America with "small warriors" for future limited wars and contingencies, armed with tailored power projection that can strike from international waters (over-the-horizon) without infringing, or depending, upon the sovereignty of any other nation. What's more, the ESG concept exploits these unique characteristics of naval power and beefs them up further with the additional crisis flexibility provided by the MEU and deep inshore striking capabilities. Thus, it may prove to be an equally lethal partner to the CSG in the Sea Strike pillar of Sea Power 21.
It does not matter to Sailors, Marines, the nation, or even future adversaries whether the ESG concept is new in concept, or merely in label. Naval history is replete with good decisions and bad that lead to triumphs and blunders. It is the duty of naval professionals to extract the nuggets of gold (and the lumps of coal), and apply them to future naval and joint operations. The linkage of naval strike and reconnaissance assets to the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Team under the ESG concept is built upon a foundation of historical employment and the subsequent lessons learned. The Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary
Team forward-deployed as an Expeditionary Strike Group will serve as a powerful preemptive and reactive force to fight the dispersed and elusive terrorist threat in the coming small wars of the GWOT.
